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Abstract
The deflationary outcome ofmonetary policy during the Great Depression had two
fundamentalcauses: 1) the Federal Reserve’s use offlawed operating guides, and 2)
adecision to make preservationofthe gold standard the overriding objectiveofpolicy.
The Great Depression resulted in lasting changes in the domestic and international
monetary regime that substantially weakened the gold standard, increased political
control of monetary policy, and created new opportunities to monetize government
debt, all ofwhich gave monetary policy an inflation bias. Uncorrected flaws in the
Federal Reserve operating strategy and the lessening ofthe gold standard constraint
enabled a sustained inflationary monetary policy to emerge in the 1960s. Ultimately,
that policy led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods System and abandonment of
international linkages altogether.
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Monetary Policy in the GreatDepression and Beyond:
The Sources oftheFed’s Inflation Bias
On August 15, 1971,President Nixon announced his“New Economic Policy.” Nixon’s
planincludedtwo featuresthat reflected on the state ofAmerican monetary policy. First, to
combat inflation, Nixon imposed wage andpricecontrols. And, second, in response to
America’s long-running andworsening international payments deficit,Nixon suspended
convertibility ofthe dollar into gold. Both policies were intendedto be temporary. Wageand
pricecontrols were temporary,but the goldwindow appears to be permanentlyshut andthe
dollarhas floated against other currencies since 1973.
The imposition ofwage andpricecontrols andsuspension of dollar convertibility
reflected the failure ofU.S. monetary policy to control inflation under the prevailing
international monetary regime -- the Bretton Woods System. Although Bretton Woods was atits
heartagold standard, it did not imposethe same level ofdiscipline on monetary policy that the
pre-wargold standard had. Under the classical gold standard, market driven gold outflows
would limitinflationary money supply growthandprovide long-runprice stability. Bretton
Woods was agold standard managedby centralbanks, however, andwith centralbank
cooperation acountry could runa long-term payments deficit ifother countries were willing to
hold its currency. The Bretton Woods System ultimately collapsed becauseother countries
became unwilling to hold dollarsandbecausethe United States was unwilling to imposea
monetary policy on itselfthatwould ensure convertibility ofdollars into gold.
The United States hadconfrontedasimilarchoice before. In 1931, uncertainty about the
ability or willingness ofthe UnitedStates to remain on the goldstandard precipitatedgold
outflows that forced American monetary authorities to make adecision. They could choose to
defendtheirgold reserve by tightening monetary policy or theycould suspend convertibility of
the dollar into gold. In the midst ofthe Great Depression FederalReserve officials understood4/14/97 2
thatatightermonetary policy mightworsen the downturn, butto preserve the gold standard they
chose to raiseinterest ratesandallowacontraction ofbank reserves.
In thispaper, I argue that American officials chose to abandon gold in 1971 because of
institutional andideologicalchanges brought about by the Great Depression. Key changes
includedanew avenue formonetizing FederalGovernmentdebt, aweakening ofthe Federal
Reserve System’s insulation from politicalinterference, andanew economic policy ideology
that doubted the stability ofprivate marketsandprescribed governmentmanagement of
aggregate demand.
The most importantchange formonetarypolicy stemming from the Great Depression
concerned the gold standard. In 1931, FederalReserve officialsviewed the gold standard as
fundamental to long-runeconomic prosperity andwere willing to defend the system even ifit
meanttaking actions that would worsenthe ongoing depression. In 1971, U.S. economicpolicy
makers no longerviewed the gold standard in thisway, and were unwilling to tighten monetary
policy to preserve the gold standard, eventhough the United States hadarising rate of inflation
andagrowing economy. The choiceto abandon Bretton Woods was made, I argue, because the
GreatDepression hadweakenedthe ideologicalunderpinnings ofthe gold standard.t
During the Depression, the gold standard hadfailed to preserve prosperity forthose
countrieswith eventhe largest reserve holdings, andsuspension provedto beaprerequisitefor
recovery in most countries (Eichengreenand Sachs, 1985). Although many people continued to
view thegold standardandfixed exchange rates positively, most believed thatthe gold standard
required the management ofgovernment officials. Thus, after World War II, the managedgold
Calomiris and Wheelock(1997) examine institutional changes to U.S. monetarypolicy making resulting
from the Great Depression, and arguethat those affecting the gold standard were the most important. That
paperfocuses on Federal Reservepolicy during 1933-41 inparticular, andduring the l950s and 1960s
generally. By contrast, thepresent paperexamines in much greaterdetail the policy record leading upto
suspension ofgoldpayments in 1971, and howitcompares with FederalReserve policy during the Great
Depression.4/14/97 3
standardofBretton Woods supplanted thepre-war gold standard. Under BrettonWoods, the
UnitedStates was able to run an inflationarymonetary policy withoutthe swift discipline ofgold
outflows. The initial impetus for inflation resulted from other changes -- increased political
pressure onthe Fed andattempts to stimulate output by increasing aggregate demand, for
example, as wellas from flaws in the Fed’s basic operating strategy. ButunderBretton Woods,
inflation could gather substantial momentum before policy makers were forced to confront the
consequences oftheirpolicies. In the face ofahemorrhagingbalance ofpayments deficit and no
strong ideologicalattachment to gold, Bretton Woods collapsed andexternal constraints on
domestic monetarypolicy were abandoned.
This paperbegins withan overviewofmonetary policy during the Great Depression. By
many, though not all, possible measures, monetarypolicy was exceptionally contractionary
during 1929-33, andI examine whythe Fed pursued such apolicyduring thisperiod. Next, I
identify anddiscusskey institutional changes to the monetary policy environmentthat resulted
directly from the Great Depression. I argue that these changes help explainthe inflation biasof
the Fed’s post-World WarII monetary policy. Finally, I describethe FederalReserve’s
response, or lack thereof, to the growing balanceofpayments deficits leading up to the collapse
of Bretton Woods in 1971,andhowthe decision to abandon gold in 1971 was alegacy ofthe
Great Depression.
Monetary Policyin the First Phase ofthe Great Depression
Byalmost any measure, monetarypolicy during 1929-33 was adisaster: the money
supply andprice level both fell by one-third, expost real interestratesreached double-digits, and
banks failed by the thousands (see Table 1). How could the Fed havelet thishappen?
The explanationsforthe Fed’s disastrous monetary policy during the Great Depression
largely fall into two categories. One attributes policy failuresto innocentmistakes or neglect,4/14/97 4
while the other contends that theFed willfullyengineered contractionarymonetary policy to
fosterbureaucratic objectives, or in response to interest group pressure. Although some political
scientists andpublic choice economists favor the latter explanation (e.g., Epstein andFerguson,
1984; Anderson, etal., 1988), most economists andeconomic historians blame theFed’s policy
on misguidedpolicy rules, as well as on pettyjealousies that limited the Fed’sability to respond
decisivelyto rapidly changing conditions.
The mostprominent explanation of FederalReserve behavior during the Great
Depression is that of Friedman andSchwartz (1963), whoargue thatadistinct shift in policy
occurredwith the deathin 1928 ofBenjamin Strong, Governor oftheFederal Reserve Bankof
NewYork. Like Fisher (1935) before them, Friedman andSchwartz (1963) contendthat Strong
understoodhowto employ the toolsofmonetary policyto minimize cyclical fluctuationsin
output andprices andto preventor limit financial panics. His deathcreatedavoid ofboth
leadership andunderstanding whichleftthe Fed unresponsive to financial crises,bank runs,and
their contractionaryeffects.
UnderStrong’s leadership, the Fed hadused thetools atits disposal to pursue both
domestic and international objectives (Wheelock, 1991). Large open-market purchases and
discountrate reductions in 1924 and 1927 were apparent attempts both to encourage domestic
economic growthandto enable GreatBritain toattract gold reserves (by lowering U.S. interest
rates relativeto those in Britain). Open-market sales anddiscount rate hikes in 1928-29, on the
otherhand, were intended to discourage stockmarket speculation, whichatleast some Fed
officials viewed as amanifestationofinflation.
On the surface, the Fed seemsto havebeenless responsive to the Depression than it had
beento earlier, smaller, cyclical downturns. Table 2 presents arough comparison ofFederal
Reserve actions during the initial phase ofthe Great Depression (1929-31)with Fed actions4/14/97 5
during the recessions of 1924 and 1927. The Fed’s IndexofIndustrial Production serves as a
measureof economicactivity. The index declinedapproximately 20 pointsfrom the cyclical
peakin April 1923 to the trough in July 1924. The recessionof 1927 was considerablymore
modest -- the index declined 11 points from October 1926 to October 1927. By contrast, the
Index ofIndustrial Production declinedby 42 pointsbetween July 1929 andJuly 1931, and
another 9 pointsfrom July 1931 to October 1931. Intermsofthe Fed’s basic policy tools -- the
discount rate andopen-market purchases ofgovernment securities -- the Fed was much less
vigorous in 1929-31 thanit hadbeenin response to the smaller recessions of 1924 and 1927.
This fact, along with the occurrence ofbanking panics andsharpdeclines in the money stock and
price level during 1929-31, lead Friedman and Schwartz (1963) to concludethat the intent and
implementation of monetarypolicy during the Great Depressionwere dramatically differentthan
they hadbeen in 1924 or 1927.2
Despitethe Fed’s weakresponse to theDepression, some researchers argue that policy
changed little,ifatall, with Benjamin Strong’s death (e.g., Wicker, 1966; BrunnerandMeltzer,
1968; Wheelock, 1991). Duringthe Depression, the Fedused borrowed reserves (discount
window loans) andmarketinterest rates as policy guides.3 When memberbanks borrowed
relatively little from the Federal Reservediscount window or market interest rates were
unusually low, Fed officials interpreted monetaryconditions as “easy.” Conversely, high levels
2 Wheelock(1991) presents econometric estimatesofthe FederalReserve “reaction function” for 1924-
1929. Simulations ofthis function also illustratethat the Fed made fewer open-marketpurchases and cut
its discountrate lessduring 1929-31 thanitwould have done underthe pre-1929 reaction function. But, as
discussedbelow, this does notnecessarilyimplythatthe policy regime, i.e., the Fed’s objectives or
strategy, had changed.
Theuse ofopen-market operations forobjectives otherthanto secure earningassetsevolved in the early
l920s, buttheiruse to manipulate instrumentsor operatingtargets, such as borrowedreserves, evolved
only gradually asthe Fedgained experience. Well intothe Depression, the directions tothe Fed’s trading
desk fromthe OpenMarket Committee specifiedthe dollar amounts ofsecurities the desk was authorized
to buy or sell. By 1932, however, discussion at OpenMarket Committee meetings turned more toward the
desired level ofexcess reserves, and focused less on the specificdollar volume ofsecurities to buy or sell.
Laterin the ‘30s, the Committeetargetedyields on Treasury securities, as well asexcess reserves.4/14/97 6
ofborrowed reserves or high interest ratessignaledthat moneywas “tight.” Once the
Depression began, both borrowed reserves andinterest rates fell sharply andgenerallyremained
low, giving Fedofficials the impression that money was plentifuland“cheap.”
The Fed’s useofdiscount window borrowing andinterest rates as policy guides during
the Depression appears consistent with the policy framework thatBenjamin Strong hadoutlined
when he was running the Fed. Speaking to FederalReserve officials in 1926, forexample,
Strong described hisrule ofthumb fordetermining howto use open-market policy during a
recession:
Should we go into abusiness recessionwhile the memberbanks were continuing
to borrow directly 500 or600 milliondollars ... weshould considertaking steps
to relieve some ofthe pressurewhichthisborrowinginduces by purchasing
government securities andthus enablingmember banks to reduce their
indebtedness....
As aguide to the timing and extentofany [open-market]purchases which might
appeardesirable, one ofourbest guides wouldbe theamount ofborrowing by
member banksin principal centers.... Our experience has shown that when New
York Citybanks are borrowing in the neighborhood of 100 milliondollars or
more, there isthen some real pressureforreducing loans, andmoneyrates tend
to be markedly higherthanthe discount rate.... When memberbanks are owing
us about 50 million dollars or less thesituation appears to be comfortable, with
no markedpressure forliquidation. (quoted by Chandler, 1958, pp. 239-40)
By Strong’s guidelines,additional open-market purchases were not called forin 1929-31. The
borrowed reserves (discount loans)of all Fed memberbanks as well as those ofNewYork City
banksdeclin& ~arbelowtheirlevels of1924 and 1927 (see Table 2). Similarly, money market
interest rateswere unusually low in 1930-31. Thus, by Strong’s measures, the stance of
monetary policy in 1930-31 appears to havebeenquite easy. Policy makersinferredthat there
was little more the Fed could, or should, do,andthat itwas now up, to the economy to respond.
As Strong (1926, p. 468) hadsaidon anotheroccasion, “TheReserveBanks do notpush credit
into use” (emphasis in original).4/14/97 7
Many economists havenotedthat rigiduse ofborrowedreserves or interest ratesas
policy instruments will cause the moneysupply to riseandfall procyclically becauseborrowed
reserves andinterest rates tendto vary positively with economic activity. Moreover, the banking
crises of 1929-33 madeborrowed reserves an especiallypoor indicator ofmonetary conditions
during the Depression because afearof runsmadebanks especiallyreluctant to suggest any
weakness to depositors,which discount-windowborrowing might do (Wheelock, 1991).
Althoughafew System officials questioned thereliabilityof borrowedreserves as apolicy guide
during the Depression, the prevailing viewwas that monetary conditionswere exceptionally
easy, andthatthe economy’s failureto expand was not thefault ofmonetarypolicy. We cannot
say forcertain whether monetarypolicy would havebeen differentduring 1929-31 had Benjamin
Strong lived, but it does seem to havebeenconsistent with Strong’s response to business cycle
downturns in 1924 and 1927, andthe guidelines forassessing the stance ofmonetary policy he
hadoutlined.
The Gold Crisisof 1931
FederalReserve policy during the initial phase ofthe GreatDepression -- from the stock
market crash in October 1929 through September 1931 -- was largely predictablefrom the policy
guidelines followed by Benjamin Strong during the 1920s. Butinterest ratesanddiscount
window borrowing shotup dramaticallyin the fourthweek ofSeptember 1931 andremained
high until early 1932. During thisperiod the Fed raised its discount rate but failed to make
significantopen-marketpurchases, even though theDepression was getting worse andmonetary
conditions were exceptionallyrestrictive.
The year 1931 was markedby aseries offinancial crises that led to suspension of the
gold standardby anumberofEuropean countries, culminating with Great Britain on September
21. Following Britain’s departure from gold, speculation thatthe UnitedStates would soon4/14/97 8
follow triggeredamassive gold outflow from the United States andattendant decline in
commercialbank reserves. The FederalReserve actedto stemtheoutflowby raising its discount
rate -- the classic defense -- but did not use open-market operationsto replacethe outflow of
commercialbank reserves.
In the sixweeks endingOctober 28, 1931, the monetary gold stock ofthe United States
declined by $727 million, or some 15 percent. At thispoint, the gold stock stabilized,but
uncertaintyabout the condition ofAmerican banks causedbank customers to redeem their
deposits forcurrency. Between mid-Septemberandthe endofDecember,currency heldby the
publicrose $544 million (11 percent). Banks borrowedheavily from the Federal Reserve to
replace reserves lostfromdeposit redemptions forgold andcurrency, eventhough the Fed had
increased its discount rate from 1.5 percent to 3.5 percent.4
The Fed madevirtually no open-market purchases ofgovernment securities during the
crisis. OnFebruary 24, 1932, the Fed’s securityportfolio was the same size that it hadbeen on
September 16, 1931,andthus open-market operations hadcontributed nothing toward offsetting
the gold andcurrency outflows. Whileincreased discountwindow borrowing offsetthese
outflows somewhat, member banktotal reserves still fell by $540 million, or 22 percent, between
mid-Septemberandthe endofFebruary.
On the surface, the Fed’s behavior in the fourthquarter of 1931 appears inconsistentboth
with BenjaminStrong’s policyguidelines andwithappropriate lender oflast resort policy. As
Friedmanand Schwartz (1963, pp. 3 15-22) describe, theFed hadacted to halt an “external drain”
ofreserves from the banking system (goldoutflows), but not the “internal drain” (conversionof
deposits into currency).
~ Thisrefersto the discount rate ofthe FederalReserve Bank ofNew York. By December,the discount
rates ofall twelve Reserve Banks were at 3.5 percent or higher. The Fed also augmented bankreserves by
purchasingbankers acceptances from memberbanks. The Fedpurchasedall eligible acceptances offered
by banks but, aswith its discount rate, the Fed increasedthe interest rate atwhich it made these purchases.4/14/97 9
The Fed arguedthat it hadnot madeopen-market purchases during the crisis of 1931
becauseits own reserve position was injeopardy. The Federal Reserve Banks were required to
maintain goldreserves equal to 40 percentoftheir notes outstanding and 35 percent oftheir
deposit liabilities (which consistedmainly ofmember bank reserve accounts). In addition,the
Reserve Banks were required to holdcollateral in the form ofgold or eligible securities against
their noteissues (goldheldas reserves alsocountedas collateral). Finally,the Reserve Banks
were required to depositgold with the U.S. Treasury equal toatleast 5 percent oftheir note
issues that were collateralizedby securities.
Securities eligible foruseas collateral forFederal Reserve noteissues includedbankers
acceptances andcommercial notes the Reserve Banks hadpurchased or discounted formember
banks, but not government securities acquiredin the open-market. Thus, purchases of
government securities increased Fed liabilities but did not addto the collateralbacking them, and
so the Fed hadto hold excess reserves before it could engage in open-market purchases.5
From July to October 1931,Federal Reserve Bankgold reserves declined from over 84
percent ofFed liabilities to 63 percent. Althoughthe Fed still hadsufficient gold to cover its
gold reserve requirement, some of its excessgold reserve was used as collateral forReserve
Bank note issues. Consequently, the Fed’s “freegold,” i.e., the amount ofgold not currently
pledgedas reserves or collateral, dwindled.
In its 1932 AnnualReport, the Federal Reserve Boardimplied thatalack of free gold
reserves hadkeptit frompurchasing government securities during the 1931 crisis,andnoted that
largepurchases hadfollowed enactment ofthe Glass-SteagallActof February 27, 1932, which
hadexpanded the types ofsecurities that were eligible for use as collateral forFed liabilities to
WhereasFed holdings ofgovernmentsecurities couldnot serve as collateral, discount window loans
always produced collateral, includingthose secured by commercial bankholdings ofgovernment
securities.4/14/97 10
include U.S. Governmentsecurities (see also the FederalReserveBulletin, March 1932).
Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 399-406) contendthatthe Fed’s claimthatalack of free gold
hadpreventedopen-market purchases was aruse, though others, such as Epstein and Ferguson
(1984, pp. 964-65) argue that Fed officials truly felt constrained by a lack ofreserves.
Regardless ofwhether or not the Fedwas constrained by its collateralrequirement,the
System hadanotheroption -- the Federal Reserve Boardhadthe rightto suspendthe Fed’s
reserverequirements. I am aware of no evidence that the Fed considered suspension, however.
Wicker (1966, pp. 169-70) arguesthat Fed officials feared that open-market purchases would
exacerbate gold outflowsby increasing doubt about the Fed’s resolve to maintainthe valueofthe
dollarin terms ofgoldover the long-run. Presumably these officials believed that suspension of
the Fed’s reserve requirements would also cause gold outflows, andhencethatacombination of
suspension andopen-marketpurchases was untenable.
Did The Fed Follow Gold Standard Orthodoxy?
Fed officials believed strongly in preservingthe gold standard andat firstglance their
policy actions appear to havereflected goldstandard doctrine. But, two aspects ofpolicy -- the
Fed’s delay in raising its discount rate following Britain’s suspension ofthe gold standard, and
the Fed’s long-time policy of limitingthe impact ofgold flows on the domestic money supply --
suggestotherwise.
Wicker (1996, pp. 86-94) argues that the gold standard played only a“minor” role in the
discount rate increases ofOctober 1931, citing the fact that the discount rate was not increased
until two andone-halfweeks after Britain suspended gold payments andthe United States had
experienced heavy gold outflows. As furtherevidence, he cites meetingrecords ofthe board of
directors ofthe FederalReserve Bank ofNew Yorkin whichGeorge Harrison, Governor ofthe
New York Fed, argued against raising rates in the wake ofBritain’s action, and then buried4/14/97 11
defense ofgold among otherreasonswhen lateradvocating adiscount rate increase. Wicker
argues that the Fed’s policy was thus not a“knee-jerk”responseto gold standard conventions.
Chandler (1971, p. 177) interprets the Fed’s delayin raisingits discount rate somewhat
differently. He argues that some Fedofficials believed thatadiscount rate increase might
suggestweakness andtherebyexacerbate goldoutflows, though fearthatarate increasemight
hurt the economy also played some part in the delay. Moreover, other Federal Reserve policy
makers did press foran immediate discount rate increase to defend the gold standard. Fed
GovernorEugene Meyer, for example, argued that “an advance in the rate was called forby
every knownrule,and ... foreigners would regard it asa lackofcourage iftheratewere not
advanced” (quoted by Wicker, 1996, p. 93). Friedman andSchwartz (1963, p. 383) citea
memorandum prepared forameeting ofthe Fed’s OpenMarket Committeein November 1931
whichconcluded that the “foreignanddomestic drainsupon bankreserves were met in the
classic way by increases in the discount rate combined withapolicyof free lending.” Although
disputingthe memo’sconclusion regarding the policy’s efficacy, Friedman andSchwartz (1963)
agreethat the Fed hadsoughtto maintain the gold standard.
Besides the delay in raising the discount rate in 1931, the Fed’s long-standing policyof
limitingthe impactofgold flows on the domestic moneystock also suggests that the Fed was not
fullycommitted to the gold standard. Gold standard doctrine (the “rules ofthe game”) heldthat
goldinflows (outflows) should be permitted to increase (decrease) acountry’s money stock and
price level so as to induce shifts in capital flows andthe balanceoftradethatwould limitfuture
goldmovements.6 Since the early l920s, however, the Fed hadlargely offset reserve fluctuations
causedby flows ofgold, currency andother sourcesby varying the quantity ofreserves supplied
6 See Eichengreen(1992) or Temin (1989) for detail about the operationofthe international gold standard
and its role in the GreatDepression.4/14/97 12
by open-market operationsanddiscount window lending. In essence, the Fed “sterilized” gold
flows, as Benjamin Strong explained in 1926:
In the old days therewas adirect relation between the country’s stock ofgold,
bank deposits andtheprice level becausebank deposits were ... based on the
stock of goldandbore a constant relationship to the gold stock.... Butin recent
years the relationship betweengold andbank deposits is no longer as close or
direct ... becausethe Federal Reserve System has given elasticity to the
country’s bank reserves.... FederalReserve bank credit is an elastic buffer
between the country’s goldsupply andbank credit. (Strong, 1926, p. 470)
Moreover, Strong credited the Fed withpreventing inflationby offsetting gold inflows in 1921
and 1922:
As the flow of gold imports was pouring into the UnitedStates in 1921 and
1922,many economists abroad, andin thiscountry as well, expected this inward
flow ofgold would result inahuge credit expansion andaserious price
inflation. That no such expansion or inflation has taken place is duetothe fact
that the amount ofFederalReserve credit in use was diminishedas gold imports
continued. Thus ... the presenceofthe Reserve System may be said to have
prevented rather than fostered inflation. (Strong, 1926, p. 471).
Althoughthe Fed generally sterilizedgold flows, it provedwilling to deviate fromthat
policy when it seemednecessary to protect the gold standard. The easing ofmonetary policy in
1924 and 1927 seemsatleast partlymotivated by adesire to repelgold inflows,andthereby
assist Britain’sability to maintain gold reserves (Wicker, 1966; Wheelock, 1991). Moreover,
when goldoutflows reducedthe Fed’s reserve ratio in 1920-21, the Fed increased its discount
rate to 7 percent (a level not reached again until 1973) andenduredasharpdeflation in order to
preserve its gold reserve. This episode demonstrated the Fed’s resolve to maintain its gold
reserveand set the precedent forits policy in late 1931. Benjamin Strong mayhave
“discovered” andactively used open-market policy, but he was unwilling to conductpolicy
outside the framework ofthe gold standard. He testified in 1928 that
When you are speaking ofefforts simplyto stabilize commerce, industry,
agriculture, employment andso on,without regard to the penalties ofviolation
ofthe gold standard, you are talking abouthumanjudgment andthe management
ofprices whichI do notbelieve in atall. (Quoted by Burgess, 1930, pp. 331).4/14/97 13
Like Strong, FederalReserve officials in 1931 viewed preservation ofthe gold standard
as fundamentalto long-runeconomic stability, andto preserve the gold standard forthe long-
term theywere willing to undertake policiesthat might be destabilizing in the short-run. Their
response to the gold crisisof 1931 mayhavesealed the fate ofHerbert Hooverandthe
Republicans in Congress, however, andensuredthe electionofpoliticianswhowould prove
willing to change dramaticallythe institutions ofmonetary policy making in the United States,
including the gold standard.
Institutional Changesto the Monetary Policy Regime1
The year 1932 markedthe beginning ofaseries ofinstitutional reforms withpotentially
largeconsequences formonetary policy (see Table 3). Among the most significant werethe
Glass-Steagall Actof 1932, whichpermitted the FederalReserve to use government securities to
backits note issues; suspension of the internationalgold standard by executive order on March 6,
1933 (ratifiedby Congress on March 9); theThomas Amendment to the AgriculturalAdjustment
Actof 1933 which, amongother things, permitted the FederalReserve to adjust commercial
bankreserve requirements; the GoldReserve Actof 1934, whichauthorized the president to fix
the dollar priceofgoldandestablishedthe Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund; andthe
Banking Actof 1935, whichmarkedly alteredthe structure ofthe Federal Reserve System and
expanded the Fed’s authority toadjust reserve requirements.
Bypermitting U.S. Govermnent securities to serve as backing forFederal Reserve notes,
the Glass-SteagallActof 1932 removed an important constraint on discretionarymonetary
policy andenhanced the Fed’s abilityto initiate transactions that monetizedgovermnent debt.8
Although he lent hisnameto the enabling legislation, Carter Glass, whohadsponsored the
This section drawsheavily on Calomiris and Wheelock (1997), where additional detail canbe found.
DuringWorld War I, the Fedlent reservesto banks against theirholdingsofU.S. Government securities
at a discountratethat guaranteed banksa profit ontheirsecurity holdings. This also had the effect of
monetizing government debt.4/14/97 14
original Federal Reserve Act, apparently voiced considerable worry aboutthe inflationary
potentialofpermitting governmentobligationsto serve as collateralfor Federal Reserve notes
(Chandler 1971, p. 189). I argue belowthat Glass was prescient in his concerns.9
The next institutional change came whenPresident Franklin Roosevelt suspended the
gold standard upon taking office in March 1933. Roosevelt was willing -- perhaps forced -- to
take the step that FederalReserve officials hadso feared. As in other countries, economic
recovery followed suspension andtherebygavecredibility to aregime of “managedmoney” (see
Eichengreen, 1992 orTemin, 1989).
Using authoritygrantedby the Gold Reserve ActofJanuary 1934, Roosevelt fixed the
valueofgoldat$35 per ounce (the previous level hadbeen$20.67). Although the ownership of
gold and its use fordomestic payments remained prohibited, the United States returnedto the
gold standard forthe settlement ofpayments with othercountries that also were on the gold
standard. The restored gold standard, however, differedfundamentally fromthe previous
standard in the degree to which its operation was removed fromprivate marketsandplaced
under control ofgovernment authorities. Americans were forbidden from holding gold, gold
clauses in private contracts were made illegal, andthe Treasury would sell goldonly for making
foreign payments.
Gold also was no longer regarded as an absolute exogenous check on government
manipulation ofthe supply ofmoney. Under the weightof the Great Depression, the ideologyof
the gold standard,whichviewedgold as fundamental toacountry’s economic prosperity, had
cracked. Although the dollar remained linked to gold, the link was weakenedand, perhaps more
‘ The Glass-Steagall Actof 1932 wasoriginally setto expire afterone year, but wasmade permanent in
1933. It should not be confusedwith the BankingAct of 1933 which, among otherthings, established
Federaldeposit insurance, separated commercial and investment banking,and outlawedthe paymentof
interest on demand deposits. The Banking Act of 1933 is also sometimes referredto as the Glass-Steagall
Act.4/14/97 15
importantly, governmentauthorities had demonstrateda willingnessto manipulatethe gold
standard to limitthe extenttowhich it would interfere with discretionary monetary policy.
Thereafter, whenthe Fed’s gold reserve requirement threatened to limitmoneysupply growth,
the reserve requirements were reducedandultimately eliminated with apparently little debate or
fanfare. The goldstandard as itexisted after 1933 was thus fundamentallydifferent from its
precursor, and foreshadowedthe Bretton Woods gold standard thatwas to replace it after World
WarII.
In addition to markingafundamental shift in the degree to whichgold served as a
constrainton domestic monetary policy, the revaluation ofgold in 1934 left the U.S. Treasury
withacapital gainofsome $2.8 billion on its goldholdings. Under authority conveyed by the
Gold Reserve Actof 1934, the Treasury used $2 billionof its windfall to establish the Exchange
Stabilization Fund: “For the purposeofstabilizing the exchange valueof thedollar, the Secretary
ofthe Treasury...isauthorized...to deal in gold andforeign exchange andsuch other instruments
ofcredit and securities as he maydeemnecessary.”
Although the operationsofthe Exchange StabilizationFund during the l930shadlittle
effect on the quantity or growth ofbankreserves, the size andopen-ended authorityof the Fund
was widely viewed as athreat to the FederalReserve System andits ability to effect monetary
policy. For example, Roy Young,then Governor ofthe FederalReserve Bank ofBoston, argued
that the Gold Reserve Act“gives the Secretary ofthe Treasury such powers, ofapermanent
nature, that he couldnullify anythingwe [the FederalReserve] could do”(quoted by Johnson
1939, p. 36). The Commercial and FinancialChronicle (January20, 1934, p. 367) hadasimilar
reaction: “TheReserve authorities havebeenreducedto shadowy nonentities, the Federal
Reserve System havingbecome simplyan adjunct ofthe UnitedStates Treasury andthe Federal
Government, to do what theyare told to do.”4/14/97 16
In addition to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, additional authorities grantedthe
PresidentandTreasury Secretary includedthe rightto “request” the FederalReserve to use open-
marketpurchases to increasebank reserves by up to $3 billion, and, ifthe Fed refused, to issue a
commensurate amount offiat currency. Thispower was grantedby the Thomas Amendmentto
the AgriculturalAdjustment Actof 1933, which, along with the Silver Purchase Actof 1934,
also authorized the purchase of silver andpermittedthe President to devaluethe silverdollar.
Between 1933 and1938, the Treasury purchased 1.8 billion ounces ofsilver, thereby increasing
bank reserves by $1 billion (some20 percent ofthe total increase in reserves during the period).
Had thePresidentchosen to devalue the dollar in terms ofsilver, the Treasury would have reaped
a $2.2 billion windfall on its silver holdings (Johnson 1939, pp. 195-98). In summarizing the
various new authorities giventhe Administration, Johnson (1939, p. 202) concludes, “The
Presidentcoulddouble or triple bank reserves, hadcomplete discretion over the gold value--and
consequently the foreign exchange value--ofthe dollar, andcould establish bimetallismby
proclamation, in otherwords, he couldcompletely refashion the monetary system ofthe country,
andthe solecriteriarequired were his own subjective evaluations ofthe situation.”
Organizational changes to the FederalReserve System mayhavealso contributed to the
Fed’s willingness to accept theAdministration’s desired monetarypolicy. The authors ofthe
FederalReserve Actagreedthat the FederalReserve System should not bea“central bank” on
the European model, but afederal system ofsemi-autonomous Reserve Banks with an
overseeingboard. Dissatisfactionwith the subsequentperformanceofthe FederalReserve, both
duringthe 1920s andduring 1929-33, led to reforms that enhancedthe authorityofthe Federal
Reserve Board atthe expense ofthe Reserve Banks. Manner Eccles accepted the chairmanship
ofthe FederalReserve Boardin 1933 with the understanding that he would have freedomto
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Reserve Bank ofNewYork, whichhe viewed as an instrument ofthe private interestsofNew
York bankers,andmeasures to ensure oversightandcoordinationofthe activities ofthe regional
Reserve Banks in pursuit ofthe national interest (Eccles 1966, pp. 170-72).
Under Eccles’ plan, whichwas largely adoptedby the Banking Actof 1935, the Board of
Governors was given substantial control over open-market operationsandFederal Reserve Bank
discount rates. The FederalOpenMarket Committee (FOMC) was reconstituted to include all
sevenmembers ofthe BoardofGovernors andjustfive ofthe twelve Reserve Bank presidents.’°
The legislationthereby increasedthe authority andstature ofthe FederalReserve officials
locatedin Washington andappointedby the President. Onthe otherhand, it also soughtto limit
the influence ofthe Presidentby removing the Secretary ofthe Treasury andComptrollerofthe
Currency as ex officio FOMC members. With his reforms,Eccles intendedthat monetary policy
makingwould be made by professionalswhose allegiance was solely to the national interest.
These changes, however, increased political pressures on the Fedatthe sametime that
establishmentofthe Exchange Stabilization Fundandother measures increasedthe
Administration’s powertoconduct monetary policy. Consequently, these reforms shiftedpower
away from the Fed toward the Treasury,andpromotedan inflation bias in monetary policy.
The Post-War MonetaryRegime
From 1933 to 1951, the FederalReserve System was largely subordinateto the Treasury
in the conductofmonetary policy. The Fed increased reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 to
absorb some ofthe largevolume ofexcess reserves that member bankshadbuilt-up. A
subsequentincrease in government securityyields angeredTreasury officials,however, andthe
~° The Banking Act of 1935 also changed the titles ofthe chiefexecutive officers ofthe Federal Reserve
Banksfrom the more prestigious “Governor” to “President,” while discontinuingthe FederalReserve
Board infavor oftheBoardofGovernors, whose members all held the title “Governor.” The Board of
Governors was alsoauthorized to approve theappointments of FederalReserve Bankpresidents and first
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Fed was forced to makeopen-market purchases andeventuallyreverse some ofthe change in
reserve requirements.
During WorldWar II, the Fed agreedto preventgovernment securityyields from rising
above predeterminedlevels. The Fed remained an instrument of debtmanagement until 1951,
when rising inflation causedFed officials to argue for an independentmonetary policy.
Negotiations betweenthe Fed andTreasuryproducedthe Accord ofMarch 1951, in which the
Treasury agreed thatthe prices of government securities should be permitted to find their market
levels andthe Fed agreed to be mindfulofTreasury debtfinancing in carrying out its monetary
policies. Tacitly,theFed accepted stability ofgovernment securitiesprices as an objective of
monetarypolicy. In particular, the Fed followed apolicy knownas “even keel” in which it
limited fluctuations in Treasury bill yields aroundTreasury issuing dates.
The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 establishedthe international monetary regime
under whichthe Fed operatedin the post-warera.” From the endofWorld WarII through
1958, internationaltrade andcapital movementstook place to the extentpermitted by exchange
andcapital controls, with international payments settled by means ofbilateral agreements among
countries. Early on, European countries ran largecurrent account deficits and the world suffered
from a“dollar shortage.” American economic strength and stability, along with the Marshall
Plan andother cooperative efforts, causedthe dollarto emerge as the keycurrencyofthe
international payments system. As the 1950s progressed, Europe strengthened economically and
several countries ran substantialcurrent account surpluses. The main western European
currencies became convertible into dollars forcurrent account transactions in 1959 (various
capital controls remained). The United States, in turn, maintainedconvertibility ofthe dollar
into gold atthe fixed priceof$35 per ounce. Bretton Woods was thus agold-exchange standard,
See Bordo(1993) or Solomon (1977)fora history oftheBretton Woods System, and Meltzer (1991)
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as its interwarpredecessorhadbeen. However, the mechanism ofdollar convertibility under
Bretton Woods was fundamentallydifferentfrom the mechanism ofthe pre-Great Depression
gold standard, andthe new mechanism explainshow the United States could conductan
inflationary monetary policy while maintaining afixed exchange rate between the dollarand
gold.
Unlikethe gold standard as itexisted before 1933,under theBretton Woods System, the
balance ofpayments could exertmonetary discipline only to the extentpermitted by central
banks themselves. This mechanism reflectedafundamentalshift in ideology, from one that saw
maintaining gold convertibility as paramount forlong-runprosperity, to an ideology that viewed
fixed exchange rates andgold convertibility as desirable, but not so important as to sacrifice
short-run economic stability in defenseofthe international system. Discretionary monetary
policy -- “managed money” -- waspermitted under Bretton Woods toadegree never before
achieved under agold standard.’2
UnderBretton Woods, American balanceofpayments deficits (surpluses) would be
reflected in rising (falling) foreign centralbank holdingsofU.S. dollars unless foreign central
banksandthe United States exchanged dollars forgold. Although foreigncentral banks could
enforcemonetary discipline on the UnitedStates, in practicetheyrefrained from doing so until
1965, when the French began large-scale conversionsofdollarsinto gold in the face oflargeand
persisting American payments deficits. Throughoutthe l960s, dollarsheld outsideofthe United
States increased rapidly, while Americangoldreserves dwindled(seeFigure 1).“ The United
12 Redish (1993) argues that Bretton Woodsrepresentedjust one of a series ofsteps away froma gold
standard operatedsolely by private markets, with little orno government interference, to a flat monetary
regime. Asnotedabove, underthe interwargold-exchange standardthe FederalReserve (and othercentral
banks)sterilized gold flows and used open-market operations and discount ratepolicy to manipulategold
flows.
‘~The data sourcesforFigure 1 are The Role ofGold in the Domesticand InternationalMonetary Systems:
Report to the Congressofthe Commission on theRole ofGold in the Domesticand International Monetary
Systems, Volume 1, Table SC- 10, column 3 (U.S. monetary gold stock) and Table SC-8, columns I and 24/14/97 20
States’ commitment to goldconvertibility thus became less andless credible. Numerous
remedies otherthan asubstantial tightening ofmonetary policy were attempted to improve the
U.S. payments deficit. But, withoutaddressing the fundamentalproblem, the Bretton Woods
System was destinedto collapse,which it did whenPresidentNixon closed thegold window on
August 15, 197l.’~
American Inflation
The Bretton Woods Systemcollapsed becausethe dollar shortage ofthe l950s was
replacedby a dollar glut in the 1 960s. The Federal Reserve pursuedamonetary policythat
contained inflation throughoutmuchofthe decade followingthe Fed-TreasuryAccordofMarch
1951. As illustrated in Figure 2, during the 1950s, the growth rate of Ml (which consistsmainly
of commercial bankdemand deposits andcurrency heldby the public) generallymovedopposite
to the rate of inflation (as measured hereby the Consumer Price Index).’5 Inflation control was
not the soleobjectiveofmonetary policy during the l950s, butdid generallycoincide with the
Fed’s other objectives of limiting fluctuations in national output and employment and preserving
stability ofthe government securities market.
The money supply growthratebegan to accelerate in the early 1960s and, by themid-
1960s, inflation hadalsobegunto rise(Figure 2). The desires ofFed officials to promote full
employment andto stabilize the yields on government securities explainthe initial acceleration
ofmoney growth. Fed officials remained committed to controlling inflation, however, andthe
accelerating inflation rate of the 1960sdid not reflecta substantial change in the taste for
inflation amongFed officials. Rather, the Fed stumbled into an inflationary policy asmuch
(world monetarygold stock), and International Monetary Fund, International FinancialStatistics
Supplement, 1972, pp. 2-3, rows 4 and4a (U.S. external liabilities).
14 A system offixed exchange rates was imposed by the Smithsonian Agreement in 1972, butthis system
collapsed in 1973 and the dollar has since floated. Sincemy interest here concerns the end ofdollar
convertibility into gold, I treatAugust 15, 1971 asthe date at which the Bretton Woods regime ended.
‘~ All series in Figures 2-4 are smoothed using a centered 13-month movingaverage filter.4/14/97 21
because offlaws in its operating strategy as because ofadesire to pursue objectives other than
inflation control.
The operating frameworkof FederalReserve policy in the 1950s and 1960s was much
like that whichBenjamin Strong haddescribed in the 1920s. That strategywas flawed becauseit
permitted destabilizing fluctuations in the supply ofmoney. I believe this helps explain whyFed
officials were able to convince themselves that their policies were promoting recovery from the
Depression when in fact theywere permittingacontractionarydecline in the moneystock
(Wheelock, 1991). Similarly, the Fed’suse ofthisoperating strategyin the 1960s explainshow
Fed officials could argue that policywas “leaning against the wind”of inflation despite
accelerating money supply growth.
The Fed’s interwar-era policy strategy, andits post-Accord reincarnation, focused on the
levelsofmarket interest ratesandthe net borrowed, or “free,” reserves ofcommercial banks.
Fed officials engagedin open-market operationsto alterthe level offreereserves, which equals
the difference between reserves that banks hold in excess of legal requirements andreserves
borrowed from the Fed’s discountwindow. Throughfree reserves,the Fed sought to manipulate
moneymarket interest rates(Treasury bill yields in the early 1960s, the federal funds rate later
on). Open-market purchases (sales) tendto addto (subtract from) the stock of freereserves, and
an increase (decrease) in free reserves was viewed as an easing (tightening) of policy. The level
offree reserves is plotted alongside the rate of inflation for the period from the Accord (March
1951) through December 1971 in Figure 3. The Fed tended to reduce free reserves to combat
increases in inflation, andincrease free reserves when inflation was declining. Thus Fed
officials sought to contractthe level offree reserves in response to the generallyrising rate of
inflation ofthe 1960s. Because market interest rates tended to rise, Fed officials were further
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Many economists, especially monetarists, criticized the Fed’s policy strategybecause of
its tendency to exacerbate swings in moneysupply growth.’6 As illustrated in Figure 4, money
supply growth accelerated throughout much ofthe 1960s, even as Fed officials ratcheted down
the level of free reserves. The evidence therefore doesnot indicatethat Fedofficials lacked
concern for inflation or failed to attempt to checkthe rising price level. Nevertheless, the Fed’s
policy permitted the money supply to riseatan inflationary rate.
The FederalReserve was not powerlessto halt the rising inflation, andFed officials
understood that inflation was contributingto the Americanbalanceof payments deficit and
threatening the gold standard. Still, under the Bretton Woods System, U.S. policy makers did
not have to make price stability the sole, or even primary, objective of monetary policy as long
as othercountries were willing to holdthe growing supply ofdollars available on world markets.
Foreign centralbanks did forbear foratime, particularly sincethe dollar was the keycurrencyof
the international payments system. This gavethe United States breathing room -- not, asit
turned out, to correct its balance ofpayments deficit, but to pursue otherpolicy goalswhile
inflation worsened andthe collapse ofBretton Woods became inevitable.
The Monetary Policy Legacyof the Great Depression
The Federal Reserve stumbled into an inflationary monetary policy in the early 1960s
because, absentdiscipline exerted by balance ofpayments deficits, policy makerswere able to
pursue otherobjectives, namely employment growth andlow interest rates on government debt.
With its focuson free reserves andinterest rates, the Fed’s operating frameworktended to cause
moneysupply growth to accelerateatan inflationarypace as economic activity expanded.
Because the Fed hadused much the same operating framework beforethe Depression, thiscause
ofinflationary policy during the 1960s was not a result ofthe Depression havingoccurred.
16 Meigs (1962) and Brunnerand Meltzer (1964) were amongthe earliest criticsofthe Fed’s free reserves
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KeynesianMacroeconomics andMonetary PolicyMaking
Muchofthe “inflationarybias” in monetary policy during the 1960s can, however, be
attributed to changed institutions andeconomic policy ideology causedby the GreatDepression.
Keynesian macroeconomics andits influence on economic policy making was an important
ideologicalproductofthe Great Depression. The influence ofKeynesian economic ideas on
policy making during the 1960s has receivedconsiderable attention (e.g., DeLong, 1995), with
Lucas (1980, p. 704) writingthat one ofthe “main featuresofthe Keynesian Revolutionandthe
neoclassical synthesis into whichit evolvedin the United States ... [was] the onset ofthe Great
Depression andthe consequent shift ofattention from explainingarecurrentpattern ofups and
downs to explaining an economy apparently stuck in an interminable down.”
Keynesian-oriented policy makers believed that monetary andfiscalpolicy could
reliably increase aggregate demandandemployment alongastable Phillips curve. Central to
discussions ofmonetary policy amongFederalReserve officials was the perceivedtradeoffof
unemployment and inflation. As FederalReserve Governor ShermanMaisel explainedit, “There
is a trade-offbetween idle menandamore stable value for the dollar. A conscious decision
must be made as to how much unemployment and loss of outputmust be made in order to get
smaller price rises” (Maisel, 1973, p. 14). Maisel added “that at least some of the Committee’s
differences on policyreflected differences in basic valuejudgments regarding the relative
importance ofvarious conflicting goals -- forexample, regarding the appropriate trade-off
between employment andpricestability” (FOMCMinutes, October 20, 1970, p. 41).’~
Maisel’sviews were widely sharedamonghis colleagues, including Arthur Burns, who
became Chairman ofthe FederalReserve Boardof Governors in 1970. Burns consistently was
‘~ The Minutes oftheFederal Open Market Committee are notverbatim transcriptions of FOMC meetings.
They do appearto givea reasonably full account ofthe discussion, however, and attribute comments to
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among those favoring an easy monetarypolicy in 1970 and 1971, andoften citedthe
consequences ofmonetary policyforemployment. At an FOMC meeting on March 9, 1971, for
example, MaiselreadaNew York Times editorial to the effect that “anyonewhowas aparty to
the use ofunemployment to combat inflation hada moral duty to leadthe way, either by
relinquishing hisjob or by contributinghis income to the support of the involuntarily
unemployed.” Burns replied that “he wantedto endorse Mr. Maisel’s ... comments,”that the
ongoing economic recovery was “fragile” andthat “rising[interest] ratescould prove fatal to the
prospects forrecovery” (FOMCMinutes, March 9, 1971, pp. 44~49)~18
To avoidconfronting the inflation-unemploymenttradeoff, Burns, like manyofhis Fed
colleagues, advocated wage andprice controls so that monetary policy could focus on fighting
unemployment. Moreover, Burns frequently arguedthat inflation associated with increases in
wages andother production costs, as opposed to excessive monetary growth, should not be
fought with tight monetary policy. At an FOMC meeting on June 8, 1971, forexample, he
argued that “Monetarypolicy could do very little to arrest an inflation that rested so heavily on
wage-cost pressures.... A much higherrate ofunemployment produced by monetary policy
would not moderate such pressures appreciably.... He intendedto continueto press [the
Administration] hard foran effective incomes policy” (FOMC Minutes, June 8, 1971, p. 51).
Burns andother Fedofficials frequently arguedthat monetary policy could not effectively
control inflation, but that fiscalpolicy andwage andpricecontrols could better accomplish the
task. Monetary policy, onthe other hand, should prevent interestrates from rising andchoking
offeconomic growth. In arguing against apolicy tightening in April 1971, Burns contended that
anyincrease in long-term interest rates would slow the economy “andthe nation mightthenenter
8 See Wells (1994) for analysis ofBurns’ views.4/14/97 25
on a long period ofeconomic stagnation. The Federal Reserve could not permit that
development” (FOMCMinutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56).
Duringthe l960s and 1970s, Fed officials believed that policyactions to push down
interest rates could promote output andemployment growth. Suchactionwould not necessarily
cause inflation, theyargued, andif it did, inflation was an acceptable costofhigh employment.
Moreover, wage andprice controls could limit inflation. It ismy view that Federal Reserve
policy makers were no less concernedabout the unemployed andthe prospects foreconomic
growth during the GreatDepression. Their views about howmonetary policy could be used to
fostergrowth,however, were almost diametrically opposed to those ofFed officials in the 1960s
and early 1970s.
In the Depression, acommonview amongFed officials was that pumping liquidity into
the economy would onlyprolong the Depressionby delaying the adjustmentsto wages and
prices that they sawas necessary for arecovery to begin. One example of this point of view is
evident in the comments ofWilliam McChesney Martin, Governor ofthe Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis during the Depressionand fatherofWilliam McChesneyMartin, Jr.,the Federal
Reserve Board’s Chairman from 1951 to 1970. In early 1930, Martin argued,
I cannot see how the situation can be benefited by putting fiftymillions of
dollars, or, in fact, anyother amount, into the general market atthistime.... The
reason that more money is not being used is because it is not needed, and when
there is already sufficient moneyto meet the expressed needs, it seems to me
unwise artificially to add to the amount already sufficient ... becausebased on a
redundancy ofmoney rather thanon actual needs maybe hazardous. (quoted by
Chandler, 1971, p. 142)
A similar view was expressedby George Norris, Governor ofthe FederalReserve Bank of
Philadelphia:
We believethat the correction must comeaboutthrough reducedproduction,
reduced inventories, the gradualreduction ofconsumer credit, the liquidation of
securityloans, andthe accumulation ofsavings through the exercise ofthrift....
We havebeenputting out credit in a period of depression,when itwas not
wantedandcouldnot be used. (quoted by Chandler, 1971, p. 137).4/14/97 26
The Governor ofthe FederalReserve Bankof San Francisco, JohnCalkins, also arguedagainst
trying to stimulate the economy by lowering interest rates:“Withcredit cheapandredundant we
do not believe that business recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper andmore
redundant” (quoted by Friedman andSchwartz, 1963, p. 372).
The viewsofMartin, Norris andCalkins were not atypicalamong FederalReserve
officials duringthe 1930s. Norwas it unusual forgovernment officials outside ofthe Federal
Reserve to hold similarviews. Secretaryofthe TreasuryAndrew Mellon,forexample, believed
that the bestmedicineforthe Depression was to “Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidatethe
farmers, liquidatereal estate ... purge therottenness out ofthe system” (quoted by Eichengreen,
1992, p. 251). Such aprescription couldhardly be called “Keynesian.”
PoliticalPressures on the Fed
The macroeconomicmodel usedbyFederal Reserve officials during the 1960s and
l970s was quite differentfromthat used in the early 1930s. Sotoo was the extentto whichthe
FederalReserve was pressured by othergovernment officials.
Although the Federal Reservehas neverbeen atruly“independent”central bank, certain
institutional changes occurring as aresult ofthe Great Depression subjected the Fed to greater
political pressure, while atthe same time increasing the opportunity for the Fed to monetize
fiscal deficits. Together these changes addedan inflation bias to monetary policy.
The Glass-Steagall Actof 1932, asnoted previously, permitted U.S. Government
securities to serve as partial backing forFederal Reserve monetary liabilities. Thus monetization
of fiscaldeficits could occur evenifthe Fed heldno excess gold or commercial paper reserves.
In the 1930s, special authorities given by Congress to the President to fix the valueofthe dollar
in terms of gold, to monetize silver, to buy andsell foreignexchange andevento order the
Federal Reserve to make open-market purchases all weakenedthe Fed’s ability to conduct an
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System itselfincreased the concentrationofpower within the Fed in the hands ofgovernment
appointees located in Washington.
Although the Fed-Treasury Accord of 1951 returnedameasureofindependence tothe
Fed, the level and stability ofgovernment security yields remainedakey focusof monetary
policy. Part ofthe explanation forthisfocus may restwith the Korean andVietnamWars. The
Fed hadensured plentiful andinexpensive funding forthe Treasury during the two worldwars,
andthe Fed mayhave sought to limit increases in government securityyields during the Korean
andVietnam episodesout ofasenseofpatriotic duty.’9 Abyproductofsuch apolicy, ofcourse,
was a faster rate of increase in the supply ofmoney.
New Dealchanges to the Fed’s internal structure mayhavealso contributed toward its
policyof limitingincreasesin interest rates. Byreducing the role ofFederal Reserve Bank
presidents in favor ofthe Boardof Governors, the Banking Actof 1935 subjectedthe Fed to
greater political influence by concentrating power in the hands ofWashington-basedofficials
who are presidential appointees. Politicalinfluence on monetary policy has beenthe subject of
extensive study (e.g., Wooley, 1984; Havrilesky, 1993), andageneral conclusion seemsto be
that the short, finite horizonofpolitical electioncycles gives politicians an incentive to favor
more expansionary monetarypolicies thandoes the public as awhole. To the extentthat
politicians are able to get the monetary policy theydesire, the result is ahigher long-runrate of
inflationthan would otherwise occur. Thus countrieswith less independent central banks tend to
havehigher inflation ratesthancountries with relatively independentcentralbanks.
An infamous example ofFederalReserve acquiescence to political pressure came in
1972 when at the request ofthe Administration Arthur Burns was allegedto have increased the
money supply growth rate to promotePresidentNixon’s reelection (see Wells, 1994 for
~ Evidenceofthis is given in Calomiris and Wheelock(1997).4/14/97 28
discussion). Whetheror not such overt pressure was exerted, it is clear thatunder both Burns
andMartinpolitical considerations influenced the setting of monetarypolicy. With the possible
exception ofNixon’s reelection, suchpressure was not overtly connectedto elections, but rather
to consideration ofthe Administration’s or Congress’ policy preferences. To the extentsuch
considerations influenced policy outcomes,theywould almost always havedone so on the side
ofpromoting inflation. 20
Monetary Policy andthe Balance ofPayments
The Fed’s operating strategy, desire to promotehigh employment, andpressureson the
Fed to keep interest rates low all gave monetarypolicy abias toward inflation. By themselves,
however, theycouldnot have resultedinasustained inflation without an accommodating
international monetary regime. Under the classical gold standard, forexample, an inflationary
monetarypolicy could not havebeensustained. But, under Bretton Woods,sustained inflation
was possible as long as foreigncentral bankswere willing to holdthe dollarstheyaccumulated
as aresult ofthe American payments deficit,rather thandemandpayment in gold forthose
dollars.
Although the Bretton Woods System provided some insulation fordiscretionary
monetary policy, FederalReserve officials understoodthat the United States could not run a
balanceofpayments deficit indefinitely. But, Fedofficials were alsowary ofcombating a
balanceofpayments deficit with policies that might interfere withother goals. On oneoccasion,
~° Burns hadaclose relationship withNixon and clearly understood the monetary policy desiredby the
Administration. Two examples ofthe interjectionofpolitical considerations into monetary policy
discussionsoccurred ata meeting ofthe FOMC in October 1970 and January 1971. On the first occasion,
Burnssuggested that committee members considerthe ‘judgments ofmembers ofCongress, senior
officialsofthe Administration, andothers” when attemptingto determine how high they were willingto let
the unemployment rate rise in fighting inflation(FOMC Minutes, October20, 1970, p. 41). Three
meetings later, Burns told the committee that “The Administration’s confidence in the System was
weakening as a result ofthe shortfallsthathad occurred in the rates ofmoney growth.... Thecredibility of
the Federal Reserve wouldbe greatly strengthenedifit became apparentthat the Committeewas seekingto
make up the ... shortfall” (FOMC Minutes, January 12, 1971, p. 37). See Calomiris and Wheelock(1997)
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PresidentAlfred Hayes ofthe FederalReserve BankofNewYork, arguedthat “I would think it
unwise to letthe goldoutflow itself affect ourmonetary policy directly, i.e., in the way ofusing
atightening move directed specifically toward stemming the flow andunrelatedto domestic
economic developments”(FOMCMinutes, November 10, 1958, p. 14-15). Anothertime, a
Reserve Bankpresident expressed concernabout the balanceofpayments deficit, but was
reluctant to advocate atighter policy forfear of disrupting the market forgovernment securities:
“Generally, he felt that the course ofmonetary policy should be moving towardamore
restrictiveposture. At the same time, he was quite concerned aboutthe rate picture in the
government securities market andthe problems facing the Treasury in the future” (FOMC
Minutes, May 5, 1959, p. 34). This reluctance to face squarely gold outflows andabalance of
payments deficit stands in marked contrastto the Fed’s reaction to gold outflows in 1931. At
that time, Fed officials agreed that maintaining convertibility of the dollar into gold ataconstant
price was fundamental to long-run economic stability, andthey were willing totighten monetary
policy in the middle ofa depressionto preservethe international monetary regime. Bycontrast,
in the 1950s and 1960s, Fed officials viewed the balanceofpayments with concern, but were
hesitant to make it the sole, or eventhe primary, focus ofpolicy. This change in philosophy,
attaching less importance to the gold standard rule andmore to discretionary policy was an
important legacy ofthe Great Depression.
Although Fedofficials were unwilling to tighten sufficiently to arrest the balanceof
payments deficit,theydid see the deficit as influencing their ability to promote domestic
economic activity. Chairman Martin,forexample, arguedthat “IftheFederal Reserve got the
reputation offollowing acheap moneypolicyjustfor the sake of doing so, people abroadwould
be encouraged to think the System was not concernedwith the balanceofpayments or the
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“Thebalance ofpayments problem ... was avital factor in the unemployment situation. Foreign
capital was finding the United States less andless attractive, therewere pressures formovement
ofcapital abroad,andthis was havingadeleterious effect on employment in thiscountry”
(FOMC Minutes, March 6, 1962, p. 56).
Fed officials also understood that the balanceofpayments deficit stemmed from
differencesin the macroeconomic policies ofdifferentcountries. At aFOMC meeting in 1959, a
Fed staffmember reported that “Thenet result ofattempts in thiscountry to validateour wage
andprice policies through monetary expansion could succeedonly ifwe could inflate the whole
world.” The staffmember wenton to argue thatexpansionarymonetary andfiscalpolicy could
“priceUnited States’ goods out ofworld markets” becauseofficials ofother countries, notably
Germany andThe Netherlands, surelywould not permit inflation in theirdomestic prices
(FOMCMinutes, May 5, 1959, p. 14). The same official, however, was unwilling to blame
monetary policy alone for the balanceofpayments deficit. In arguingthat gold outflows “call
foragenerally restrictive credit policy ... more effective corrections ... would be moves to reduce
the budgetary deficitand the checkingofpricerisesdue to wage and other cost increases”
(FOMC Minutes, October 21, 1958).
TheFed’s unwillingness to tighten sufficiently to stemthe balanceofpayments deficit
led it to consider other actions it might take. One ofthe earliest ofthe policies intended to
restoreexternal balance was “OperationTwist”--an attempt to raise short-term interest rateshigh
enough to attract foreign capital, while keepinglong-term interestrates lowenough to favor
domestic expansion.
Other policies intendedto correct international payments imbalances without slowing
domestic activity included agreements with foreign central banks to forebear from demanding
gold, intervention in foreign exchange markets, the issuance of foreign currency-denominated
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U.S. Government,the removal ofinterest rateceilings on U.S. banktime deposits, capital
outflow constraints imposed in theUnited States, andchanges in U.S. tax treatmentof foreign
earnings. Balance ofpayments deficits continued, however, andthe long-term feasibility ofthe
existingdollargold-exchange standard grew increasingly doubtful.
The Collapse of Bretton Woods
When Arthur Burns took overas chairmanofthe Fed’s Boardof Governors in early
1970, the U.S. economy was slidingtowardarecession, the inflation rate stoodat6.5 percent
(first quarter average annualized rateofCPI inflation), andthe U.S. balance ofpayments had
beenin deficit nearly every yearsince the late 1950s. At hisfirst meeting, Burns announced that
“in hisjudgment, economic developments hadreached apoint atwhich arethinking of monetary
policy was in order” (FOMCMinutes, February 10, 1970, p. 3). It quickly became apparentthat
Burns would makeavoidance ofarecession his firstpriority. Against three dissents,the Federal
OpenMarket Committee votedto ease monetary policy at thatmeeting. One ofthe dissenting
votes came from Andrew Brimmer, whoexpressed the hope that “the Committeewould not lose
sight ofthe highlyunfavorable outlookforthebalanceofpayments andwould give the payments
balance somewhat greater thancustomary weightin formulatingpolicy over the nearterm” (ibid,
p. 59).
Federal OpenMarket Committee meetings usually begin withanalysis ofeconomic
conditions by Fed staff members, andduring 1970 and 1971, the stafffrequently expressed
pessimismabout the balanceofpayments deficit. Following the staffreports, thereusuallywas a
report fromaFed governor, often Dewey Daane,whoattended aregular meeting ofcentral bank
officials in Europe. The U.S. payments deficit was aprincipal topic atthose meetings, with the
Europeans frequentlyquestioning American resolve to control inflation (see, e.g., FOMC
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deliberations,however, because after hearingthe summaryofthe European meeting, the
Committeewould reviewdomestic economic conditionsanddiscussthepolicy directive, usually
with little or no reference to the balance ofpayments.
At the FOMC meeting of October 20, 1970, the Fed staff gaveaparticularly lengthy and
pessimistic report on thebalanceof payment. Following the report, Burns “saidhe could add
oneword ofreassurance. Workon the balanceofpayments problem was going forward actively,
andhe was confidentthat adequate measures forgrappling with the problemcould be devised”
(FOMCMinutes, October 20, 1970, p. 21). Fromthis comment, itis clearthat Burns viewedthe
balanceofpayments deficitasa problemthat couldbe controlledeffectivelywithout monetary
policy action. Moreover, the comment reflects the fact that the Treasury, especially
Undersecretary Paul Volker, was takingthe lead in devising America’s international economic
policy.
Despite the seeming lack ofinfluenceofthebalance ofpayments deficit on Federal
Reserve policy, some ofthe Fed’s staff as wellas the occasional governor, warned about the
worsening payments deficit. At an FOMC meeting on June 23, 1970,the first vice president of
the NewYork Fed arguedthat “Aconvincing andsustainedattackon domestic inflation remains
essential forimproving our balanceofpayments andstrengtheningconfidence in the dollar”
(FOMCMinutes, June 23, 1970, p. 57). On anotheroccasion, Alfred Hayes, Presidentofthe
NewYork Fed noted that “astiffprice isbeing paidfor the easing of moneymarket conditions in
the UnitedStates.... International conditions underline the needforgivinghigh priority to the
inflation problem” (FOMCMinutes, September 15, 1970, pp. 43-44). But, GovernorMaisel
replied that
Itwould be improperto assume that balance ofpayments considerations should
be a constraint on [policy]. Ifthe balanceofpayments remained unsatisfactory
with demandstill far belownormal, that wouldappear to be an indication of
basic structural problems in the balance ofpayments sphere. The Committee
should be working to correct those structural imbalances rather than assuminga4/14/97 33
posture whichtradedofflosses ofincome, output,andjobs in an attemptto
offset basic structural defects in the balanceof payments sphere. (ibid. p. 46)
Arthur Burnsadded that “He believed that balanceofpayments considerations should not
prevent the Committeefrom taking the policy actions it felt requiredby the domestic economy”
(ibid. p. 65). Later in the same meeting Burns advocated “special measures,” presumably capital
controls or similarmeasures, to deal with the balanceofpayments deficit (ibid, p. 81). Burns
reiterated thisview on February 9, 1971: “Chairman Burns commentedthat while the System
was facedwith international as wellas domestic problems, the latterwere the more pressing.
Moreover, special tools were available fordealing withthe former”(FOMCMinutes, February 9,
1971, p. 92).
The balanceofpayments deficit grewincreasinglyworse in early 1971,andthe Fed’s
staffwarnings became stronger. At the March FOMC meeting, aFed staffmember warned that
“Sooner or later — and he suspectedthat it wouldbe sooner -- thecentralbank complaints now
being voiced privately [abouttheir build-up ofdollarbalances] would become knownto the
market, whichmightthendecide to protect itselfagainst the riskofasudden break in the
structureofexchange parities” (FOMCMinutes, March 9, 1971, p. 22). Anotherstaffmember
reported that
1) the balance ofpayments deficit in the first two months of thisyear was
enormous; [and] 2) the monetaryaggregates havebeen growingvery rapidly.
Whatconnects thesetwo sets offacts isthe very steep decline in short-term
interest rates. It is not surprising, therefore, that the short-term capital outflow
has beenextremely large.... Considerable reluctancehas beenbuilt up abroad,
especiallyamong fmancialofficials in Europe,overwhat they regard asan
undermining oftheir ownmonetary policies resulting from themassive short-
term capital outflows from the United States and from the steep decline inshort-
term rates. The impression exists that ... the United States has completely
ignoredthe effects its policiesare havingon the restofthe world. (ibid, pp. 28-
29)
As the year 1971 progressed, the international payments crisis worsened. At the FOMC
meeting ofMay 11, NewYork Fed president Hayes remarked that “We are ... in the midst ofan4/14/97 34
international monetary crisis.... Avoteofno confidence in the dollar hasbeen taken by several
centralbanks” (FOMC Minutes, May 11, 1971, p. 53). Hayes alsoreportedthat the directorsof
the Federal Reserve Bank ofNewYork hadvoted to increase the Bank’s discount rate by 1/2
point, the same steptaken in response to a flight from the dollar in October 1931:
The directors felt in thismajor international crisis therewas nothing the System
coulddo thatwould be moreuseful andmoretimely thanto givean overt signal
ofour concernandour willingness to move quickly toward narrowing the
interest rate spread whichwas amajor cause ofthe difficulty.... While
recognizingthe risks involved inageneral increase in domestic interestrates,
theyfelt that thoseriskswere outweighedby international conditions. (ibid, pp.
55-56)
The BoardofGovernors turneddown the NewYork Bank’s request foradiscount rate
increase, citing weakness in the domestic economy, the adverse effects ofhigher interest rateson
the mortgage market andthe market forstate andlocal government debt,andthe likely
instability that adiscountrate hikewould cause in all financial markets. At the prior FOMC
meeting, Burns seemto havepredictedtheNewYork Bank’s requestforadiscount rate increase
when he relayed that “He hadavivid recollectionofdevelopments in 1931,when the Federal
Reserve hadraised its discount rate andacted to stiffen short-term ratesbecauseofabalanceof
payments problem, andan incipient [domestic economic] recovery hadbeencut off”(FOMC
Minutes, April 6, 1971, p. 56). For Burns, the lesson of 1931 was to put the domestic economy
first, aheadofthe balance ofpayments andpreservation ofthe gold standard.
Conclusion
The failures ofeconomic policy, especially monetary policy, during the Great
Depression producedseveral significant institutional andideological changes in the monetary
policy regime. Not surprisingly, because monetary policy was associatedwith deflation and
contraction during 1929-33, the new regime includedfeaturesthat gavepolicy an inflation bias.
Thosefeatures includedbothanew avenue formonetizing government debtand increased4/14/97 35
political control ofFederal Reserve policy. The Great Depression also put the new economics of
Keynes, with its emphasis on government management ofaggregate demand, into the
professional andpolicy mainstream.
The most fundamental legacy ofthe Great Depression formonetary policy, however,
concernedthe international gold standard. Although governments interferedwith the operation
ofthe gold standardbefore 1933,andan unsettledquestion amongeconomichistorians is the
extentto whichalaissez-faire’ gold standard would haveproved more stable, akey lesson taken
from the Great Depression was that the international monetary system required active
management ofgovernment officials. Faiththat the goldstandard would ensureprosperity was
destroyed, as was anynotion thatadisasterworse thanthe Depressionwould resultifthe gold
standard was abandoned. Beginning in 1933,andcontinuing atleast to the 1970s, the dominant
ideologywas that agold standardand fixedexchange rates are desirable, but not worth
sacrificing high employment to maintain. This change in attitude,andthe institutional changes
accompanying it,largely explains the inflationary monetary policy ofthe l960s andearly 1970s,
as wellasthe decision to abandon goldandfixed exchange ratesin 1971-73.
Since the l970s, the pendulum has swung away from inflationary monetary policy
somewhat. The costs ofhigh inflation andthe seeming inabilityofaggregate demandpolicy to
maintain full employment helpedpromoteNewClassical macroeconomicsand causeda
rethinking ofthe appropriate goals ofmonetary policy among government officials. Several
countries now specify inflation targetsfortheircentral banks, and have formally adopted price
stability as the paramount objective formonetarypolicy. The institutional environmentof
monetary policy in the United States, however, has not changedsince 1973,whenfixed
exchange rates were abandoned. The legacy ofthe Great Depression formonetary policy was in
causing an institutionaland ideologicalshift to a managed, discretionary monetary regime. The
fundamentals ofthisregime remain in place today.References
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Selected Measures ofMonetary Policy and EconomicActivity
Nominal Real Bank Fail Interest Real
Year GNP % change GNP % change CPI % change Ml % change M2 % change Failures Deposits Rate Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1919 78.9 74.2 74.0 21390 30320 62
1920 88.9 11,93 73.3 -1.22 85.7 14.68 23592 9.80 34708 13.52 167 5.42 -9.26
1921 74.0 -18.34 71.6 -2.35 76.4 .11.49 20955 -11.85 32212 -7.46 505 172188 4.83 16.32
1922 74.0 0.00 75.8 5.70 71.6 -6.49 21618 3.11 33646 4.36 366 91182 3.47 9.96
1923 86.1 15.14 85.8 12.39 72.9 1.80 22653 4.68 36411 7.90 646 149601 3.93 2.13
1924 87.6 1.73 88.4 2.99 73.1 0.27 23226 2.50 37992 4.25 775 210151 2.77 2.50
1925 91.3 4.14 90.5 2.35 75.0 2.57 25362 8.80 41691 9.29 618 167555 3.03 0.46
1926 97.7 6.78 96.4 6,32 75.6 0.80 26082 2.80 43539 4.34 976 260378 3.23 2.43
1927 96.3 -1.44 97.3 0.93 74.2 -1.87 25796 -1.10 44384 1.92 669 199329 3.10 4,97
1928 98.2 1,95 98.5 1.23 73.3 -1.22 25761 -0.14 45861 3.27 498 142386 3.97 5.19
1929 104.4 6.12 104.4 5.82 73.3 0.00 26189 1.65 45918 0.12 659 230643 4.42 4.42
1930 91.1 -13.63 95.1 -9.33 71.4 -2.63 25293 -3.48 45303 -1.35 1350 837096 2.23 4.86
1931 76.3 -17.73 89.5 -6.07 65.0 -9.39 23883 -5.74 42598 -6.16 2293 1690232 1.15 10.54
1932 58.5 -26.56 76.4 -15.83 58.4 -10.71 20449 -15.52 34480 -21.14 1453 706188 0.78 11.49
1933 56.0 -4.37 74.2 -2,92 55.3 -5.45 19232 -6.14 30087 -13.63 4000 3596698 0.26 5.71
1934 65.0 14.90 80.8 8.52 57.2 3.38 21068 9.12 33073 9.46 57 36937 0.26 -3.12
1935 72.5 10.92 91.4 12.33 58.7 2.59 25199 17.90 38049 14.02 34 10015 0.14 -2.45
1936 82.7 13.16 100.9 9.89 59.3 1.02 29630 16.20 43341 13.02 44 11306 0.14 -0.88
1937 90.8 9.34 109.1 7.81 61.4 3.48 30587 3.18 45195 4.19 59 19723 0.45 -3.03
1938 85.2 -6.37 103.2 -5.56 60.3 -1.81 29173 -4.73 44100 -2.45 54 10532 0.05 1.86
1939 91.1 6.70 111.0 7.29 59.4 -1.50 32586 11.06 47681 7.81 42 34998 0.02 1.52
1940 100.6 9.92 121,0 8.63 59.9 0.84 38763 17.36 54328 13.05 22 5943 0.01 -0.83
1941 125.8 22.35 138.7 13.65 62.9 4.89 45349 15.69 61296 12.07 8 3726 0.10 -4.79
Notes: (1) $ billions (Historical Statistics, Fl)
(2) $ billions, 1929 prices (Historical Statistics, F3)
(3) 1947-49=100 (HistoricalStatistics, El 13)
(4) $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963,Appendix Al)
(5) $ millions, June figure (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963,Appendix Al)
(6) suspended banks (Board ofGovernors, 1943,p. 283)
(7) deposits insuspended banks (BoardofGovernors, 1943,p. 283)
(8) yearly average yield on 3-6 month Treasury notes andcertificates (1919-33) and bills (1934-41)
(Board ofGovernors, 1943, p. 460)
(9) short-termGovernment yield less CPI inflation rate insameyear
%change refers to year-to-yeardifferences inthelogs of the series tothe leftTable 2
Monetary Policy During Three Recessions
Month fl~ Q~ 12R~ j~J~ /2j~ji.n’cj
Jul1929 124 147 5.0 6.00 1096 319
Oct1929 118 154 6.0 6.25 885 74
Jan 1930 106 485 4.5 4.88 501 39
Apr1930 104 530 3.5 3.88 231 17
Jul 1930 93 583 2.5 3.25 226 0
Oct1930 88 602 2.5 3.00 196 6
Jan1931 83 647 2.0 2.88 253 5
Apr1931 88 600 2.0 2.38 155 0
Jul 1931 82 674 1.5 2.00 169 0
Oct 191 73 733 3.5 3.13 614 74
Apr1923 106 229 4.5 5.38 658 123
Jul 1923 104 97 4.5 5.13 834 143
Oct 1923 99 91 4.5 5.38 873 121
Jan1924 100 118 4.5 4.88 574 85
Apr 1924 95 274 4.5 4.63 489 45
Jul 1924 84 467 3.5 3.50 315 13
Oct 1924 95 585 3.0 3.13 240 28
Jan 1925 105 464 3.0 3.63 275 32
Oct1926 111 306 4.0 4.63 663 84
Jan 1927 107 310 4.0 4.25 481 76
Apr1927 108 341 4.0 4.13 447 78
Jul 1927 106 381 4.0 4.25 454 59
Oct 1927 102 506 3.5 4.00 424 75
Jan 1928 107 512 3.5 4.00 465 94
Definitions:
IP: Index of Industrial Production (seasonally adjusted);
GS: Federal Reserve System’s holdings ofgovernment securities (in $ millions);
DR: discount rate of the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York (in %);
i: commercial paper interest rate (in %);
DL: borrowed reserves ofFed member banks;
DL (NYC): borrowed reserves ofNew York City Fed member banks.
Data sources: Board ofGovernors (1937) pp. 175-77 for IP, and Board ofGovernors
(1943) pp. 370-7 1 for GSand DL, pp.440-41 for DR, pp. 450-5 1 for i, and p. 400 for
DL(NYC).Table3
KeyInstitutional Changes in Monetary Policy in the Early 1930s
1932 Glass-SteagallAct (February 27): temporarily made U.S. Government
securitieseligible collateral forFederal Reserve note issues, thereby expanding the Fed’s
ability to make open-market purchases (made permanent in 1933); also temporarily
relaxed rules on discount-window lending (extended in 1933,madepermanent in 1935).
1933 Emergency BankingAct(March 9): ratified suspension of the gold standard.
ThomasAmendmentto AgriculturalAdjustmentAct (May 12): authorized the Fed to set
reserve requirements;gavethe presidentauthority to require open-marketpurchases by
the FederalReserve, andto fix the weights of the gold andsilverdollars.
BankingAct of1933 (June 16): enhanced Federal Reserve Board control of discount-
window lending; technical adjustments to FederalReserve System organization.
1934 GoldReserveAct (January 30): authorized transfer ofmonetary gold stockto the U.S.
Treasury; amended the president’s authority to fix the dollar prices of gold and silver;
and establishedthe Exchange StabilizationFund.
SilverPurchase Act (June 19): authorized the president to purchase and nationalize
monetary silver; authorized limited Federal Reserve lending to industrial and
commercial firms.
1935 BankingActof1935 (August 23): reorganized Federal Reserve’s Open Market
Committee andotherwise enhanced the authority ofthe Board ofGovernors ofthe
Federal Reserve System relative to the Federal Reserve Banks; extended Federal Reserve
authority to adjustmember bank reserve requirements.FIgure 1
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